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THE MIGINGO ISLAND DISPUTE
BETWEEN KENYA AND UGANDA
Christopher R. Rossi*
9d#LriQa’sc great hydrographiQ basins Z Z Z tend to beQo/e new
areas of conflict. Around these basins not only economic activ-
ities but also serious contradictions have emerged. The nonco-
incidence of the borders of states and natural borders has
opened the way to disputes over sovereigntyZ81
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INTRODUCTION
igingo is one of three closely situated islands in the east-
ern waters of Lake Victoria,2 approximately fifteen kilo-
meters from the nearest Kenyan mainland port in the western
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1. Achille Mbembe At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality,
and Sovereignty in Africa 272N73 (2000).
2. The two other islands are Ugingo (Usingo) and Pyramid Island. Ugingo
is two hundred meters (660 feet) east of Migingo; Pyramid Island is two kilo-
meters (1.2 miles) south of Migingo. The lake has many names. On the Tanza-
nian side, it is referred to as Lake Ukerewe. It is also known as Nalubaale,
M
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Migori district, and two hundred kilometers from the nearest
mainland port in Uganda.3 It measures about one half acre in
size,4 or two thousand square meters (twenty-two thousand
square feet). For most of its history, it remained an uninhabited
outcropping, a dot on the second largest fresh water lake in the
world.5 Beginning in 2000, climate changes to the hydrological
cycle of the Lake Victoria Basin,6 a basin long regarded as sus-
ceptible to significant water table fluctuations,7 resulted in
alar/ing di/inutions to the water table oL #LriQa’s largest laHeZ8
Sango, and Lolwe in other parts of East Africa. The Bantu word for the lake is
Nyanza. In 1858, Richard Burton and John Speke 9discovered8 and named
Lake Victoria in pursuit of the source of the Nile River. Many people of East
Africa still refer to it by its colonial name, as it will be referenced in this article.
Calls to Africanize its name, however, present some difficulty, given the many
peoples of East Africa. See, e.g., Mboneko Munyaga, Change the Name ‘Lake
Victoria’, ARUSHA TIMES, http://www.arushatimes.co.tz/2011/7/Society_6.htm.
3. Museveni Complicates Kenya-Uganda Island Dispute, PANAPRESS (May
12, 2009), http://www.panapress.com/Museveni-complicates-Kenya-Uganda-
island-disputeK13-525259-18-lang1-index.html (noting the island’s location in
relation to the nearest Ugandan and Kenyan land ports). By motorboat, the
trip takes two hours from Ongukwa, Kenya. See Gragory Nyauchi, Migingo
Island: Nothing to Write Home About, EAST AFRICAN (Jan. 9, 2015),
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/magazine/Migingo-islandKNothing-to-write-
home-about-/-/434746/2582598/-/qgyg1cz/-/index.html.
4. SeeKwamchetsi Makokha,Why Raila Should Be Barred From Invading
Migingo, DAILY NATION (Mar. 26, 2016), http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opin-
ion/Why-Raila-should-be-barred-from-invading-Migingo/440808-3133958-
11gs67/index.html (noting that Migingo measures 9less than half an acre8 in
size).
5. See JOSEPH L. AWANGE & OBIERO ONG’ANG’A, LAKE VICTORIA: ECOLOGY,
RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT 1 (2006) (stating that Lake Victoria is the second-
largest lake following Lake Superior).
6. See generally The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report: What’s In It For Af-
rica, CLIMATE & DEV. KNOWLEDGE NETWORK (2014), http://cdkn.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2014/04/AR5_IPCC_Whats_in_it_for_Africa.pdf.
7. Joseph L. Awange et al., GRACE Application to the Receding Lake Vic-
toria Water Level and Australian Drought, inOBSERVINGOURCHANGINGEARTH
387, 387 (Michael G. Sideris ed., 2008) (noting significant lake-level fluctua-
tions in the early 1960s and stating that, by 2006, the lake’s level dropped more
than 1.1 meters below its ten-year average).
8. See AWANGE&ONG’ANG’A, supra note 5, at 327 (receding at an alarming
rate). See also Joshua Kyalimpa, Experts Warn of Dire Consequences as Lake
Victoria’s Water Levels Drop Further, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/09/experts-warn-of-dire-consequences-as-lake-
victorias-water-levels-drop-further/.
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Despite dire long-term implications,9 the receding water pre-
sented an economic opportunity for a small number of enterpris-
ing Lisher/en, who began using Migingo’s newly eaposed Qraggy
shore as a port in 2001.10 Reports soon circulated that its sur-
roundings earned fishermen three to four times in a day what
shore-based counterparts earned in a month.11 Migingo’s repu[
tation as a rich fishing ground swelled its population to more
than one thousand inhabitants,12 quickly turning the islet into a
microslum. But, its position in the lake makes the half-acre is-
land a strategic offshore weigh station and encampment for com-
mercial export of Nile perch (mbuta),13 attracting as epiphenom-
ena pirates,14 smugglers,15 and contested claims of sovereignty.
Ecologists have long puzzled over the appearance of Nile perch
in LaHe 3iQtoria’s watersZ :o/e evidenQe suggests 7ganda’s
9. See Awange et al., supra note 7, at 387 (signaling disastrous challenges
ahead for the thirty million people whose livelihood depends on Lake Victoria’s
health).
10. See Kakeeto A. Richard et al., Managing Trans-Boundary Water Con-
flicts on Lake Victoria with Reference to Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, in
SHAREDWATERS, SHAREDOPPORTUNITIES: HYDROPOLITICS INEASTAFRICA 65, 67
(Bernard Calas & C.A. Mumma Martinon eds., 2010) (noting the appearance
of water patrols in 2001 due to fishing on Migingo).
11. Sam Shead, A Real Treasure Island! Small Land Mass Housing Shanty
Town Is at Heart of Battle Over Prime Fishing Waters, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 14,
2012, 8:20 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2203467/A-real-
treasure-island-Small-land-mass-housing-shanty-town-heart-battle-prime-
fishing-waters.html.
12. Emmanuel Kisiangani, Dispute Over Migingo Escalates, INST. FOR
SECURITY STUD. (Aug. 17, 2011), https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/dispute-
over-migingo-escalates. 80 percent of Migingo’s inhabitants are Kenyans, the
remainder is split between Ugandans and Tanzanians. Id.
13. Numerous reports indicate that two Kenyan fishermen, Dalmas Tembo
and George Kibebe, first settled on the islands in 1991, followed by Ugandan
fisherman, Joseph Nsubuga in 2004, who found only an abandoned house. See,
e.g., Kelvin Odoobo, The Migingo Island Circus, NEW TIMES (Apr. 26, 2009),
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/78895/.
14. See Uganda Kills 3 Tanzanian Pirates on Migingo Island, NEW VISION
(Oct. 6, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vi-
sion/news/1410150/uganda-kills-tanzanian-pirates-migingo-island; Daniel
Howden, Migingo: Big Trouble on Small Island, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 22, 2009,
12:00 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/migingo-big-trou-
ble-on-small-island-1651736.html.
15. See Eric Shimoli & Patrick Mayoyo, Revealed: Hidden Players in
Migingo, DAILY NATION (May 16, 2009), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/598728/-/u69u28/-/index.html (revealing well-organized smuggling oper-
ations enjoying patronage from Ugandans with Kenyan connections).
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Game and Fisheries Department secretly introduced the
nonnative species in the 1950s to bolster sport fishing.16 By the
1980s, its population had exploded, coinciding with a fivefold in-
crease in its commercial value as a restaurant item in Europe.17
The Lish also is a devastating pisQavore, 9one oL the best-studied
invasive speQies in historyZ818 Ut threatens halL oL LaHe 3iQtoria’s
five hundred species of endemic cichlid fish with extinction, up-
sets the eQologiQal balanQe oL the world’s largest tropical lake,19
and is turning this diverse multispecies Great Lake into an an-
thropogenic adulteration, mostly sustaining three fish species.20
The acute financial and resource dispute over the Nile perch
catch, which may ultimately self-regulate through overfishing,
overshadows a coming ecological disaster that would affect the
livelihood oL thirty/illion people around LaHe 3iQtoria’s shoreZ21
16. Robert M. Pringle, The Origins of the Nile Perch in Lake Victoria, 55
BIOSCIENCE 780, 783 (Sept. 2005).
17. Id. See also UGANDA FISH PROCESSORS AND EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.ufpea.co.ug/ (last visited July 21, 2017) (identifying the European
Union as the largest market for Nile perch).
18. Pringle, supra note 16, at 780.
19. Dirk Verschuren et al., History and Timing of Human Impact on Lake
Victoria, East Africa, 269 PROC. R. SOC. LONDON 289, 289 (2002) (discussing the
probable extinction of up to half of Lake Victoria’s five hundred species of en-
demic cichlid fishes); Sy Montgomery, The Fish That’s Killing Lake Victoria,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-02-22/local/me-
30078_1_lake-victoria/2.
20. See Pringle, supra note 16, at 780 (listing the Nile perch, the nonindig-
enous Nile tilapia, and the diminutive R. argentea as the three remaining spe-
cies of fish).
21. See Kiarie Njoroge, Kenya Fish Earnings Flat as Nile Perch Numbers
Drop, Survey Shows, BUS. DAILY (May 15, 2016, 3:47 PM), http://www.busi-
nessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-fish-earnings-flat-as-Nile-Perch-numbers-drop/-
/539546/3204600/-/pbl6xz/-/index.html (reporting a 15 percent decrease in the
Kenyan harvest of fresh water fish, mainly attributed to the decline in fish
catches from Lake Victoria); O.C. Mkumbo & B.E. Marshall, The Nile Perch
Fishery of Lake Victoria: Current Status and Management Challenges, 22
FISHERIES MGM’T AND ECOLOGY 56 (2015). Dropping water levels have de-
stroyed the shallow water breeding grounds of Nile perch, making Migingo’s
surrounding waters one of the few remaining breeding grounds. See generally
Ernest Waititu, DIMINISHING WATER RESOURCES THREATEN PEACE, PULITZER
CENTER ON CRISIS REPORTING (May 26, 2009), http://pulitzercenter.org/arti-
cles/diminishing-water-resources-threaten-peace. A variety of international
and regional organizations have formed to manage the ecology and economics
of Lake Victoria/Nyanza, including the Lake Victoria Basin Commission
(2001), a specialized institution of the East African Community (EAC); the
Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization, established by the 1994 Convention for
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But, rich harvests of Nile perch currently generate $250 million
USD in yearly trade for the East African economies of Kenya,
Uganda, and Tanzania.22 Migingo’s proai/ity to the Senyan
shore decisively controls the economics of this industry,23 and
the majority of its inhabitants are ethnic Luos from Kenya.24
Kenya owns 6 percent of Lake Victoria, but its processors har-
vest 180,000 metric tons of fish for export; Uganda, however,
owns 43 percent of the lake but exports only seventy thousand
metric tons through its processing plants.25 The perceived imbal-
ance in the Nile perch trade, compounded by the discovery of
the Establishment of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization; the Lake Vic-
toria Environmental Management Project, involving Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda, and the World Bank (founded in 1994, and expanded in 2010); the
Partnership Agreement on the Promotion of Sustainable Development in Lake
Victoria (between the EAC and the governments of Sweden, France, and Nor-
way, the World Bank, and the East African Development Bank (2001); and the
Nile River Basin Initiative (2006). See INTERNATIONAL WATERS GOVERNANCE,
http://www.internationalwatersgovernance.com/lake-victoria-basin-commis-
sion-and-the-lake-victoria-fisheries-organization.html (last visited July 22,
2017). Rwanda and Burundi have been added to the Lake Victoria Fisheries
Organization as part of an expanded lake catchment region. See Joint Commu-
niqué of the Council of Ministers of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization
Issued in Nairobi, Kenya on 29th January 2016, East African Community Lake
Victoria Fisheries Organization Secretariat, http://www.internationalwa-
tersgovernance.com/lake-victoria-basin-commission-and-the-lake-victoria-
fisheries-organization.html.
22. See Mkumbo & Marshall, supra note 21, at 56 (noting that, despite in-
dications of decline, the Nile perch accounts for 60 percent of the total landed
value of fish from Lake Victoria).
23. The nearest Ugandan land port is approximately one hundred kilome-
ters from Migingo; the nearest Kenyan land port is ten kilometers away. See
Peter Wafula Wekesa, Old Issues and New Challenges: The Migingo Island
Controversy and the Kenya-Uganda Borderland, 4 J. E. AFR. STUD. 331, 335
(2010).
24. Id. at 331.
25. See Ugandan Perspective on Migingo Island Border Issue (Hoover),U.S.
Dep’t of State Cable No. 09Kampala482_a, WIKILEAKS (May 8, 2009),
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KAMPALA482_a.html (unclassified cable
from the U.S. Embassy in Kampala to [U.S.] Secretary of State, Intergovern-
mental Authority on Development (IGAD), Rwanda).
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commercially viable oil deposits across the East African Rift Sys-
tem in 2006,26 possibly including deposits under Lake Victoria,27
weigh heavily in the emergence of a major East African dis-
pute.28
Kenya and Uganda dispute ownership of Migingo, which has
led to multiple confrontations, war talk,29mediated bilateral and
multilateral discussions,30 and debates in the East African Leg-
islative Assembly and the Pan African Parliament.31 Even if
Migingo were indisputably in Senya’s sovereign waters, as
26. May Jeong, Uganda: Oil Brings Quick Cash, Dashed Hopes, AL JAZEERA
AM. (May 30, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/5/30/uganda-
oil-brings-fast-cash-dashed-hopes.html (noting exploratory oil strikes by Brit-
ish, French, and Chinese companies in the Albertine Basin in 2006). The East
African Rift System involves the earth’s tectonic forces that cover Ethiopia,
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. See James Wood & Alex Guth, East Africa’s
Great Rift Valley: A Complex Rift System, GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/ar-
ticles/east-africa-rift.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
27. Duncan Macgregor, History of the Development of the East African Rift
System: A Series of Interpreted Maps Through Time, 101 J. AFR. EARTH SCI.
232, 250 (2015) (concluding that, likely, there are more petroleum systems to
be discovered across the East African Rift System).
28. See The Migingo Island Dispute Which Way for Kenya and Uganda,
NATIVE E. AFR. (Mar. 24, 2016), http://native-eastafrica.org/the-migingo-is-
land-dispute-which-way-for-kenya-and-uganda/ (noting that the delayed de-
velopment of Uganda’s fishing industry following years of misrule and neglect
is a major cause of the dispute).
29. See Speech of President Kibaki Opening the Third Session of the Tenth
Parliament, reprinted in U.S. Dep’t of State, Cable No. 09Nairobi809_a,
WIKILEAKS (Apr. 21, 2009), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/09NAIROBI809_a.html (unclassified cable (Ranneberger), Kibaki Ad-
dresses Opening of Parliament); Risdel Kasasira & John Njagi, Kenyan MP
Calls for War over Migingo, DAILYMONITOR (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.moni-
tor.co.ug/News/National/Kenyan-MP-calls-for-war-over-Migingo/-
/688334/3121072/-/pr8xsr/-/index.html; Kwamchetsi Makokha, Why Raila
Should be Barred from Invading Migingo: Raila Odinga Could Easily Plunge
Kenya into War over a Rocky Piece of Land, DAILY NATION (Mar. 26, 2016),
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Why-Raila-should-be-barred-from-in-
vading-Migingo/-/440808/3133958/-/4xhpyq/-/index.html (discussing former
Kenyan prime minister Raila Odinga’s belligerent stance against Uganda).
30. For instance, at the Lusaka African Union Summit (2009); the Kampala
Bilateral Ministerial Meeting (2009); the Kisumu Technical Officers’ Meeting
(2009); and the Kenya-Uganda joint meeting on the resumption of the joint
boundary summit (2011).
31. National Assembly Official Report, KENYANATIONALASSEMBLYOFFICIAL
RECORD (HANSARD) 7 (June 3, 2009) (statement of Mrs. Shabesh on East Afri-
can Legislative Assembly and Pan African Parliament debates).
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7ganda’s President eoweri Museveni may have suggested,32
much of the catch allegedly derives from fishing activity in
Ugandan waters, giving rise to unyielding Ugandan claims of
Senyans’ poaQhing and taa evasion and7gandan poliQe and/il[
itary presence in the disputed area.33 Kenyan fishermen insist,
however, with some scientific support, that the Nile perch breed
oLL Senya’s swa/py laHeshore and /igrate into deeper water
aroundMigingo, thus entitling the country to take the fish wher-
ever caught.34 The argument lacks legal support today but high-
lights a codependency condition that one day may facilitate res-
olution. The argument stirs proprietary assertions over lakes
and seas reminiscent of sixteenth century European debates: the
seas /ust be 9Hept8 _QhieLly^ Lor LishingZ35 It also highlights the
32. During a 2009 lecture in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the president of
Uganda was quoted as saying: 9The island is in Kenya, the water is in Uganda.8
Eric Shimoli, Museveni: You Got Me Wrong On Migingo, DAILY NATION (May,
15, 2009), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/598508/-/u69sfj/-/index.html.
Ugandan authorities later claimed the president’s statement was miscon-
strued as applying to Migingo and insisted was actually referring to Suba Is-
land. See id.; see also Museveni Complicates Kenya-Uganda Island Dispute, su-
pra note 3 (affirming Museveni’s statement that the island is in Kenya).
33. See Eric Shimoli & Patrick Mayoyo, Revealed: Hidden Players in
Migingo, DAILY NATION (May 15, 2009), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/598728/-/u69u28/-/index.html (noting claims that Migingo is a haven for
tax evasion and of military advantage to Uganda).
34. Jeffrey Gettleman, Ripples of Dispute Surround Tiny Island in East Af-
rica, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2009), at A4.
35. William Welwood (1578N1622) made a similar argument in a rejoinder
to Hugo Grotius’ argument relating to the inexhaustibility of living resources
of the sea inMare Liberum (1609). According to Welwood:
If the uses of the seas may be in any respect forbidden and
stayed it should be chiefly for the fishing. . . . For whereas
aforetime the white fishes daily abounded even into all the
shores of the eastern coast of Scotland, . . . the shoals of fishes
are so broken and so far scattered away from our shores and
coasts that no fish can now be found worth of any pains and
travails, to the impoverishing of all . . . our home fishers and
to the great damage of the nation.
WILLIAMWELWOOD, OF THECOMMUNITY AND PROPRIETY OF THE SEAS (1613), re-
printed in David Armitage, Introduction, in THE FREE SEA: HUGOGROTIUS 73N
74 (2004). See also JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM (1935); THOMAS WEMYSS
FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA: ANHISTORICALACCOUNT OF THECLAIMS
OF ENGLAND TO THE DOMINION OF THE BRITISH SEAS, AND OF THE TERRITORIAL
WATERS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RIGHTS OF FISHING AND THE NAVAL
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fluid and subjective conception of African interstitial space,
which involves complex religious, commercial, and historical
networks of activity that simultaneously established and
blurred temporal pluralities at the edges of African borderland.
One such plurality involves the porous Lake Victoria catchment,
which overlaps and interlaces historical forms of identity, move-
ment, and cultural practice.36 Problems of colonialism, develop-
ment, African state-building, national unity, and political con-
solidation37 provide context but cannot mask the concentration
on emerging resources, such as the Nile perch and oil prospects,
as key elements driving this conflict.
In 2004, this dispute took a problematic turn. In that year, re-
ports surfaced of Ugandan interlopers (settlers) appearing on
Migingo, vexing Ugandan-Kenyan relations.38 By 2006, Ugan-
dan customs officers arrived and began assessing levies on Ken-
yan fish harvests.39 7ganda’s Wisheries Ministry organi`ed a
Migingo Beach Management Unit to oversee the collection of ad-
ministration fees.40 Between 2008 and 2009, tensions between
the two countries elevated when the Ugandan Marines occupied
the islet41 and expelled Kenyan fisherman for failing to pay li-
censing fees and for not using Ugandan processors for all fish
caught within Ugandan territorial waters.42 At this time, a
SALUTE A 29 (2005) [1911]. InMare Liberum, Hugo Grotius conceded that, un-
like seas, lakes could be owned because lakes did not have the same fluid char-
acter as seasKthey 9wash against the land on all sides.8 HUGOGROTIUS, MARE
LIBERUM 1609N2009, 81 (Robert Feenstra ed., 2009).
36. See Achille Mbembe, At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territorial-
ity, and Sovereignty in Africa, 12 PUBLIC CULTURE 259, 259N60 (2000) (noting
the historical and overlapping temporal pluralities across Africa’s porous bor-
derland regions, including African watersheds).
37. See Wekesa, supra note 23.
38. See, e.g., Milton Olupot, Kenya: Ugandan Settled on Migingo in 2004,
ALLAFRICA (Mar. 29, 2009), http://allafrica.com/stories/200903300126.html (re-
porting on the appearance of Ugandan occupiers of Migingo in 2004).
39. Cable, U.S. Embassy: Migingo IslandKThe View From Kenya,
WIKILEAKS (May 8, 2009), http://www.scoop.co.nz/sto-
ries/WL0905/S01128/cablegate-migingo-island-the-view-from-kenya.htm.
40. Id.
41. See National Assembly Official Report, KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORD (HANSARD) 3327N28 (Nov. 11, 2008). See generally Jack
Shaka,Migingo Island: Kenyan or Ugandan Territory? 4 J. CONFLICTOLOGY 34,
34 (2013).
42. See National Assembly Official Report, supra note 41 (recording a Ken-
yan parliamentary debate on pursuing a high-level diplomatic resolution to the
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Ugandan flag also appeared over the islet.43 In response, twelve
Kenyan police dispatched to reassert sovereignty over Migingo,
prompting the arrival of sixty Ugandan marines one day later.44
The occupation provoked Kenyan rioters to uproot landlocked
7ganda’s vital rail linH to the Senyan port oLMo/basa, through
which 80 percent of Ugandan imports arrive.45 Consequently,
7ganda and Senya stood at the brinH oL #LriQa’s s/allest warZ
High-level diplomatic discussions produced a fragile arrange-
ment, allowing fishermen from both countries to continue busi-
ness as usual under joint police supervision until a Joint Tech-
nical Committee of experts evaluated the disputed border.46
Matters of criminal jurisdiction were to be referred to the courts
oL the suspeQt’s nationalityZ47 Surveying work, however, stalled
when the joint verification team disagreed on methodology,48
and a new row erupted in early 2016, when the Ugandan-con-
trolled Beach Management Unit shut down a Kenyan electoral
occupation of the island by Ugandan forces and the posting of the country’s
flag).
43. See Howden, supra note 13 (reporting that Uganda’s national flag was
hoisted over the island along with another flag bearing the colors of the Ugan-
dan police authority).
44. See id.
45. See THE MARITIME PORT OF MOMBASA, N. CORRIDOR TRANSIT AND
TRANSPORT COORDINATION AUTHORITY (2016),
http://www.ttcanc.org/page.php?id=27 (last visited July 22, 2017).
46. See Barbara Among & Reuben Olita, Uganda Has Lowered Its Flag on
the Disputed Migingo Island in Lake Victoria to Pave Way for the Demarcation
Exercise, NEW VISION (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vi-
sion/news/1221958/uganda-removes-flag-migingo. A Joint Ministerial Com-
munication signed in Nairobi on July 26, 2011, and announced in Kampala by
Uganda’s Inspector General of Police and Kenya’s Commissioner of Police, lim-
ited police presence to twelve officers from each country. See Risedel Kasasira,
Uganda, Kenya Reach Accord over RockyMigingo Island, DAILYMONITOR (Aug.
24, 2011), http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/-/691252/1224264/-/format/xhtml/-
/maj12vz/-/index.html. See also GBENGA ODUNTAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
BOUNDARYDISPUTES IN AFRICA 159N60 (2015).
47. See Kasasira, supra note 46.
48. See Kisiangani, supra note 12 (discussing technicalities besetting the
2009 joint East African cooperative initiative to demarcate the disputed border
on Lake Victoria). The Uganda team returned to Kampala after disputing the
erection of a new boundary pillar demarcating the westernmost point within
the meaning of the 1926 British Order in Council. The Kenyan surveyors un-
officially completed the survey, claiming Migingo Island was 510 meters (1,670
feet) east of the Kenya-Uganda border. Id.
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Qo//ission’s atte/pt to register islandersZ49 A joint communi-
qué issued by the Kenya-Uganda Joint Border Commission
urged expedited resolution of the marine boundary issue and re-
solved to constitute a joint committee to end the dispute.50 Were
it only so easy.
The Migingo Island dispute intertwines latent intramural and
international issues of ethnicity, nationality, and politics around
the temptations of competing sovereign claims over newly emer-
gent resourQesZ ULMigingo is #LriQa’s s/allest war in waiting, its
elusive resolution presents problems for bilateral relations and
for East African cooperative initiatives of economic and political
integration.51 The dispute directly challenges efforts of the Afri-
can Union Border Program to solve border conflicts in Africa and
in cross-border areas involving strategic resources.52 Migingo
represents another example of one of the enduring problems of
postcolonial Africa: the lingering effects of uti possidetis (as you
possess, so you may possess), which accommodated postcolonial
line drawing rather than the human geography affected by its
49. Manuel Odeny, Tension on Migingo Island After Uganda Police Stop
Voter Registration, THE STAR (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2016/03/09/tension-on-migingo-island-after-uganda-police-
stop-voter-registration_c1309762.
50. Wycliff Kipsang, Joint Team to Tackle Migingo Row, DAILY NATION
(Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Joint-team-to-tackle-Migingo-
row/-/1056/3126102/-/gb0pjs/-/index.html.
51. Wekesa, supra note 23, at 336, 338 (concluding that the Migingo issue
exposes the underlying fragility of East African regionalism efforts and mech-
anisms).
52. The African Union Border Program (AUBP) is an important component
of the African Union’s peace and security objectives. It is funded extensively by
the German government and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit. Its efforts forwarding negotiated settlement of African bor-
der disputes were endorsed by the Executive Council of the African Union
Commission. See 11th Ordinary Session, Accra, Ghana (June 25N29, 2007), as
adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues,
ADDISABABA (June 7, 2007) (endorsing the AUBP and its Implementation Mo-
dalities). See also Pan-African Conference on Maritime Boundaries and the
Continental Shelf for the Implementation of the African Union Border Pro-
gramme, ACCRA (Nov. 9N10 2009), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/conclu-
sions-accra-eng-.pdf (referencing and extending the 2007 declaration). For a
general overview of its activities and case studies pertaining to African demar-
cation and boundary issues, see DELIMITATION AND DEMARCATION OF
BOUNDARIES INAFRICA: GENERAL ISSUES ANDCASESTUDIES, COMMISSION OF THE
AFR. UNION, DEP’T PEACE AND SECURITY (2d ed. 2014),
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-2-en-2013-delim-a-demar-user-guide.pdf.
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arbitrary application.53 Interestingly, the course of dealing
charted by the fishermen, and more informally by the pirates
and smugglers who ply the waters, suggests that a condominium
or shared sovereignty arrangement provides a solution, if only
Uganda and Kenya would acknowledge this second-best out-
Qo/e Lor #LriQa’s/ost reQent QonLlagration ste//ing Lro/ nine[
teenth century colonial rule.
This article will assess the prospects for a peaceful resolution
to the Migingo Island dispute, suggesting the relevance of a con-
structivist perspective. Constructivism emphasizes a world of
social facts that inform and are informed by human interac-
tion.54 The basic structures of international relations, for in-
stance the state system and sovereignty, are intersubjective ra-
ther than material creations; and the international norms mak-
ing up these structures not only regulate behavior but also shape
and are shaped by behavior, ultimately communicating shared
understandings, intentionally or unwittingly.55 A constructivist
approach does not explain how the world changes or what people
do; it is not a theory, understood as such. It is an approach to
understanding problems and evolving solutions that recognizes
the social construction of reality and the dynamism of interna-
tional law and relations’ toolsKinstitutions, norms, rules, and
language,56 emphasized, as is the case here, by historical con-
text. An appreciation of historical context sheds necessary light
53. See generally GIUSEPPE NESI, L’UTI POSSIDETIS IURIS NEL DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE (1996); JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS (2003).
54. See generally NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING:
RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1989) (in-
troducing the theory of constructivism).
55. Christian Reus-Smit, The Politics of International Law, in THEPOLITICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14, 21 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004).
56. See generally Nicholas Onuf, Constructivism: A User’s Manual, in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CONSTRUCTED WORLD 58N78 (Vendulka Ku-
bálková, Nicholas Onuf & Paul Kowert eds., 1998).
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on concrete problems of world politics57 and avoids abstract se-
ductions of theory,58 while acknowledging the possibility of frag-
mentation of understandings, interests, and the malleable
norms and rules that create opportunities for change or conflict.
The relatively small size and scale of the Migingo Island dis-
pute reLleQts greater historiQal tendenQies% Migingo’s proble/s
retell conflicts of international law that afflict international re-
lations large and small. But, changing circumstances caused by
technology, discovery, or, in this case, by changes to the Great
Lake in the Anthropocene age, have awakened dormant territo-
rial disputes that stem from deep historical divisions, exacer-
bated in an African context by complications rooted in colonial-
is/ and the Hobson’s !hoiQe taHen by #LriQan elites to aQQept
conditions of historical fait accompli by accepting border demar-
cations that often make no sense except to sustain raison d’etat.
Modalities for a condominium or shared sovereignty arrange-
ment develop notwithstanding appearances of impasse but en-
counter the state tendency to territorialize resources when in-
terests and abilities align. This territorializing tendency acts as
a drag on negotiated solutions to the problem. Although criti-
cized as a workable legal solution,59 the international legal con-
struct of condominium may, as metaphor, pick the lock held by
Uganda and provide the key held by Kenya to end this dispute;
but, if accomplished, it must also account for the repository vault
of territorial temptation.
In addition to this introduction, this article will proceed as fol-
lowsZ Wirst, Part U will situate Migingo’s proble/ in historiQal
context. It will focus on the partitioning of Africa by European
powers in the late nineteenth century that unintentionally, but
nevertheless, direQtly Qonditioned Migingo’s Late. Part II will
57. See ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 4
(Steve Smith et. al. eds., 1999) (noting the ultimate test of any method’s worth
is its ability to address concrete problems).
58. See Theory Talk #70: Nicholas Onuf, THEORY TALKS (July 2, 2015),
http://www.theory-talks.org/2015/07/theory-talk-70.html?m=1 (acknowledging
theoretical failings of constructivists).
59. See Peter Schneider, Condominium, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 732, 734 (Rudolf L. Bernhardt ed., 1992) (labeling condo-
minium an 9historical relic8 and 9patently inadequate8); J.H.W. VERZIJL, 6
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69 (J.P.S. Offerhaus & Wybo
P. Heere eds.,1973) (calling condominium solutions 9peculiar and excep-
tional8).
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then highlight the additional cartographic shortcuts that pro-
duced the border demarcation now in dispute and the constitu-
tive legal document that the disputants acknowledge as control-
lingKthe 1926 British Order in Council. Part III will identify the
reason why the parties accept this document as controllingK
their support of the principle of uti possidetis. Here, however, it
is argued that the rhetorical acceptance of the principle of uti
possidetis contrasts with its dysfunctional application, which
creates an impasse and feeds through its dysfunction the terri-
torializing temptations of Uganda and Kenya over resources at
the heart of the dispute. Countering these developments are the
evolving instrumentalities and agencies of shared sovereignty
arrangements, which offer prospects for a condominium agree-
ment negotiated between the disputants or through structures
created by regional or continental integration organizations.
This article will conclude with a discussion of all of these pro-
spects through historical examination, underscoring an aware-
ness that constructivism presents multiple pathways and out-
Qo/es, liberal and illiberal, that await the world oL Migingo’s
making.
I. MIGINGO’S FATE IN CONTEXT
The dispute over Migingo transplants problems of boundary
demarcation that have menaced continental Africa to an islet in
the world’s largest tropiQal laHeZ The topiQal signiLiQanQe oL the
problem belies a deep and troubled history of line drawing that
overlaps the Euclidean precision of Western cartographic think-
ing with the interstitial and experiential spatial dynamics of Af-
rican cultures.
A. The Scramble for Africa
Migingo’s Late began with the 9:Qra/ble Lor #LriQa8 in the late
nineteenth century, an acceleration of imperial activity in sub-
Saharan Africa first initiated by Portugal almost six centuries
ago.60 This phrase dates back to the International Association of
60. See James Duffy, Portugal in Africa, 39 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 481, 481 and
486 (1961) (noting the Portuguese territories in Africa established the oldest
European colonies in the world beginning in the fifteenth century); cf. Jeffrey
Herbst, The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa, 43
INT’LORG. 673, 674 (1989) (noting the first penetrations by Portuguese explor-
ers of the Zambezi River in the early 1500s).
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the Congo, a Belgian expeditionary commission that concluded
450 treaties and contracts with chiefdoms of the Upper Congo
between 1882 and 1884.61 The agreements allowed King Leopold
II of Belgium to lay personal claim over the Congo River Basin,
stimulating a climate of competitive annexation that threatened
war among European powers.62 By this time, however, France
had already penetrated Algeria and Tunis, Spain kept a 9watQh[
Lul eye8 over MoroQQo’s sultan, and Utaly had designs on #bys[
sinia and treaty rights over Somaliland.63 By 1875, Britain had
negotiated a majority stake over control of the Suez Canal64 and,
more alarmingly, expanded its supervisory role in Egypt follow-
ing its defeat of nationalist forces during the Urabi rebellion of
1882.65 In the Middle East generally, and in the Maghreb and
Arab Africa regions specifically, colonies often existed before co-
lonialism,66 the protogenesis of a trading-post economy Europe-
ans established on continental coasts.67
To 9obviate /isunderstanding and disputes8 over 9new aQts oL
oQQupation8 in sub-Saharan Africa, German Chancellor Otto von
Bismark, following diplomatic exchanges of entente with the
61. I COLONIALISM: AN INTERNATIONAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 661 (Melvin E. Page, gen. ed., & Penny M. Sonnenburg, asst.
ed., 2003). Welsh-American explorer, Henry Morton Stanley, was personally
recruited to head up the commission (officially called the Comité d’Etudes du
Haut Congo) and did so between 1879 and1884. For his account, see INIIHENRY
M. STANLEY, THE CONGO AND THE FOUNDING OF ITS FREE STATE: A STORY OF
WORK AND EXPLORATION INII (1885). See generally THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: 1876-1912 (1991); D.A. LOW, FABRICATION OF EMPIRE:
THEBRITISH AND THEUGANDAKINGDOMS 1890N1902 (2009).
62. PHILIP CURTIN, THE EUROPEAN CONQUEST IN AFRICAN HISTORY: FROM
EARLIEST TIMES TO INDEPENDENCE 398, 410 (Philip Curtin et al., eds., 1995).
See also III J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(STATE TERRITORY) 532 (1970) (noting the French action to conclude treaties to
secure the watershed between Congo and Niadi-Quillou basins in 1885); and
A.C.MCEWEN, INTERNATIONALBOUNDARIES OFEASTAFRICA 230N31 (1971) (dis-
cussing power struggles in the Congo).
63. See ELIZABETH WORMELEY LATIMER, EUROPE IN AFRICA IN THE XIX
CENTURY 189N90 (1896).
64. See Editorial Comment, Egypt a British Protectorate, 9 AM. J. INT’L L.
202, 202N03 (1915) (noting French interests in the Suez Canal).
65. Matthew Craven, Between Law and History: The Berlin Conference of
188471885 and the Logic of Free Trade, 3 LON. REV. INT’L L. 31, 36 (2015).
66. See JUAN RICARDO COLE, COLONIALISM AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST: SOCIAL AND CULTURALORIGINS OF EGYPT’SURABIMOVEMENT 3 (1999).
67. Mbembe, supra note 36, at 265.
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French foreign ministry,68 convened fifteen states for the Berlin
West Africa Conference of 1884N1885.69 The resulting General
#Qt re/ains a QenterpieQe oL international law’s Qlose nine[
teenth-century association with imperialism.70 Although focused
on navigation possibilities of the Congo and Niger watersheds,
by 1900, the conference established the informal ground rules
for European continental conquest that partitioned Africa along
lines that looked much as they would in 1960, when seventeen
African nations achieved independence, or even later.71 The con-
ference, through its amalgam of ancillary discussions, also
served as a template for the regulation of another kind of tribu-
tary systemKthe divisible sovereignty system that subcon-
tracted colonial government to private contractors or joint-stock
companies and colonial chiefs, creating a comprador class of im-
perial functionariesKWestern spatial imaginairesKwho
reimagined space and territory along linear boundaries and put
them to a European use as they spread aQross #LriQa’s Vreat
68. See Craven, supra note 65, at 36.
69. See generally No. 128NPreamble, General Act of the Conference of Ber-
lin, relative to the Development of Trade and Civilization in Africa, the free
Navigation of the Rivers Congo, Niger, &c., the Suppression of the Slave Trade
by Sea and Land, the occupation of Territory on the African Coasts, &c. Signed
at Berlin 26th February 1885, in II E. HERTSLETTHEMAP OFAFRICA BYTREATY
468, 468 (3rd ed. 1967) [HERTSLET, THE MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY]. Other
stated purposes of the conference included regulating trade development, free
navigation on Africa’s chief rivers flowing into the Atlantic Ocean, and further-
ing the moral and material well-being of native populations. Id. Attendees in-
cluded the United States, Turkey, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Rus-
sia, and the then-united Sweden and Norway. Id.
70. See Craven, supra note 65, at 31 (noting the conference’s 9canonical
place in historical accounts of 19th-century imperialism8). For broader presen-
tations and critiques of international law and nineteenth century imperialism,
see JOHN R. MORSS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE LAW OF COLLECTIVES: TOWARD
A LAW OF PEOPLE 39N53 (2013); See generally SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF
UNIVERSALITY (2012); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1860N1960
(2002); U.O. UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLONIALISM IN AFRICA
(1979).
71. See Curtin, supra note 62, at 410N12.
674 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:2
Lakes region.72 These auxiliaries served as indirect agents of im-
perial power, penetrating deeper into #LriQa’s interior through
the conclusion of treaties and concords neither allowed nor
thought possible in Europe.73 The Dutch East India Company
established this model in its seventeenth-century rise to promi-
nence in Asia.74 The futQh East Undia !o/pany’s Qharter Lro/
the 7nited ProvinQes granted it Lree reign to serve the state’s
security interests on the cheap.75 It could raise and maintain ar-
mies and navies, pursue war or sue for peace, and divert a por-
tion of the receipts of its commercial monopoly to strengthen its
military to claim more ground and expand the interests of its
state suitor.76 The formula worked well, both in terms of destroy-
ing the Spanish trading empire in the Mediterranean and the
Portuguese Fidalgos’ _noble/en^ Qolonial Qontrol over #sia _the
Estado da Índia)77 and delivering colonial rewards to the United
Provinces as overseer of the commercial markets once ruled by
the great sultanates of Indonesia and the Malay peninsula.
In the late nineteenth century, Africa, Germany, and Britain
again took up this territorializing model.78 A competition be-
tween German and British trading companies produced sphere-
72. See, e.g., ANTHONY KIRK-GREENE, BRITAIN’S IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATORS
1858N1966 (2000); L.H. GANN & P. DUIGNAN, THE RULERS OF BRITISH AFRICA
1870N1914 (1978). See also Mbembe, supra note 36, at 265N66 (noting the de-
vices of discipline and command modeled on chiefdoms that extended the ad-
ministrative and social power of the colonial state), 283 (9Western spatial im-
aginaires8) (footnote omitted), and 260 (discussing the domestication of world
time and putting it to a different use).
73. See Curtin, supra note 62, at 426.
74. See, e.g., JONATHAN I. ISRAEL, DUTCH PRIMACY IN WORLD TRADE, 1585N
1740 (1989).
75. See generally A Translation of the Charter of the Dutch East-Indies
Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC): Granted by the States
General of the United Netherlands, Mar. 20, 1602 (Rupert Gerritsen, ed.,
2009), http://rupertgerritsen.tripod.com/pdf/pub-
lished/VOC_Charter_1602.pdf.
76. See, e.g., VICTOR LIEBERMAN, STRANGE PARALLELS, VOL. 2: MAINLAND
MIRRORS: EUROPE, JAPAN, CHINA, SOUTH ASIA, AND THE ISLANDS (Michael Adas,
Patrick Manning, and Philip Curtin, eds. 2009).
77. See generally ISRAEL, supra note 74; and C.R. BOXER, FIDALGOS IN THE
FAREAST 1550N1770 (1978).
78. See generally BISMARCK, EUROPE AND AFRICA: THE BERLIN AFRICA
CONFERENCE 1884N1885 (Stig Forster, Wolfgang Mommsen, and Ronald Rob-
inson eds., 1988); JOHNHATCH, THEHISTORY OF BRITAIN IN AFRICA (1969); and
BRITAIN ANDGERMAN INAFRICA: IMPERIALRIVALRY ANDCOLONIALRULE (Prosser
Gifford & Wm. Roger Louis eds.,1967).
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of-influence agreements in 188679 and 1890.80 The 1890 agree-
ment delimited the northern boundary of the German sphere of
inLluenQe as 9the point on the eastern side oL LaHe 3iQtoria
Nyanza [as it was then called] which is intersected by the 1st
parallel of south latitude; thence, crossing the lake on that par-
allel . . . to the frontier of the Congo Free State, where it termi-
natesZ881 A regional partition resulted, spreading westward
across East Africa from Dar es Salaam and the Sultanate of Zan-
zibar on the Indian Ocean. The German East Africa Company
took full control over Tanganyikan territories on the southern
littoral of Lake Victoria,82 while an Imperial British East Africa
Company formed (and later failed) and occupied Kenya, Uganda,
and the great kingdoms of the Luo, Suba, Samia, Kisii, Luhya,
Busoga, and Buganda, which border the northern and northeast-
ern tiers of the lake.83 By 1895, German and British spheres be-
came more defined, with Germany ceding influence north of the
present Kenya-Tanzania border to the British Crown, which
took over the commercial monopoly previously granted to the
bankrupt Imperial British East Africa Company, and declared
an East African protectorate over what is now Kenya.84 A series
of agreements stemming from the Imperial British East Africa
79. See Agreement between the British and German Governments, respect-
ing the Sultanate of Zanzibar and the opposite East African Mainland, and
their Spheres of Influence, Gr. Brit.-Ger., Oct 29-Nov. 1 1886, in III HERTSLET,
THEMAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY 882N86 (1909) [Agreement between the British
and German Governments].
80. See Agreement between the British and German Governments, supra
note 79, at 899N906
81. Id. at art. 1(1); MCEWEN, supra note 62, at 99.
82. See Curtin, supra note 62, at 426.
83. See M.F. HILL, PERMANENTWAY: THE STORY OF THE KENYA AND UGANDA
RAILWAY, BEING THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANSPORT
SYSTEM INKENYA ANDUGANDA 12 (1949) (discussing the development of Anglo-
German spheres of influence north and south of Lake Victoria (Victoria
Nyanza)). For a breakdown of the early settlements, population, and demo-
graphic features of the Lake Victoria basin, see AWANGE & ONG’ANG’A, supra
note 5, at 11N15 (2006); and Wekesa, supra note 23, at 334 (noting that the
Kenya-Uganda border division also divided the Iteso, Saboat, and Pokot peo-
ples).
84. See Agreement between the British and German Governments, supra
note 79, at 383 (declaring the official East Africa Protectorate following an
agreement between Great Britain and Zanzibar respecting the possessions of
the Sultan of Zanzibar on the Mainland, signed at Zanzibar on December 12,
1895, id. at 382). See also James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and
International Law 54 BUFFALO L.R. 1013, 1019 (2007).
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!o/pany’s F?>E withdrawal Lro/ 7ganda Qreated the 7ganda
Protectorate under the control of the British Crown by 1894N
1895.85 Protectorates developed as a recurring, yet equivocating,
form of imperial rule in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.86
They avoided the financial costs of full incorporation, a matter
of public debate and concern to the British Exchequer at this
time, but allowed the colonial power to maintain influence. In
1920, Kenya became fully incorporated as a colony, while
Uganda remained under protectorate status until its independ-
ence in 1962, but distinctions between the two blurred with the
British practice of governing protectorates as if they were colo-
nies.87
B. Imperial Line Drawing
Imperial line drawing, in addition to splitting the Lake Victo-
ria region into northern and southern spheres of great power in-
fluence,88 bisected lineages, kinships, kingdoms, ethnicities, and
human histories, making the natural geography a recurring hu-
man subject of dispute for Uganda, Kenya, and their neighbors.89
85. See Provisional Agreement between King Mwanga of Uganda, and Sir
G. Portal, Uganda-Gr. Brit., May 29, 1893, in IIIHERTSLET, THEMAP OFAFRICA
BY TREATY, supra note 79, at 393N95; Notification. British Protectorate over
Uganda, June 18, 1894, id. at 395; Treaty. Great Britain and Uganda. British
Protectorate, Gr. Brit.-Uganda, Aug. 27, 1894 [Approved by Her Majesty’s Gov-
ernment, January 4, 1895], id. at 396.
86. See generally KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 70, at ch. 2. See also MALCOLM
SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES 46N48
(1986) (discussing 9colonial protectorates8); and M.F. LINDLEY, THE
ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO COLONIAL
EXPANSION 182N83 (1926) (conflating the terms, but regarding colonial protec-
torates as conferring a status on the protecting power, should steps be taken
to annex the protected territory).
87. See Gathii, supra note 84, at 1033.
88. GIDEONS.WERE&DEREKA.WILSON, EASTAFRICATHROUGHATHOUSAND
YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE YEARS A.D. 1000 TO THE PRESENTDAY 155N57 (1968).
89. See SHAW, supra note 86, at 50 (noting that ethnic considerations were
generally ignored in the process of European colonization of Africa). Julie Mac-
Arthur also notes that 9long histories of migration, intermarriage, and inter-
ethnic exchange complicated bureaucratic efforts to align people into neatly
ordered columns of sanctified and unchanging tribal groupings.8 JULIE
MACARTHUR, CARTOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION: MAPPING
COMMUNITY INCOLONIALKENYA 3 (2016).
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In addition to the Migingo controversy with Kenya, Uganda dis-
putes the Moyo, Adjumani, and Yumbe district boundaries with
its northern neighbor, South Sudan, and before that, Sudan,90
and warred with Tanzania over the Kagera region.91 The colonial
administrative partitioning created diasporadic pockets of eth-
niQity a/ong RilotiQ peoples oL Senya’s Vreat ;iLt 3alley,92 ex-
acerbating historic tensions between large ethnic groups, such
as the Luo and Kikuyu, which erupted in near genocidal carnage
between 2007 and 2008.93 Indeed, border disputes throughout
East Africa continue to pose security threats.94 For example,
9eaQh oL the Qountries in Eastern #LriQa has had at least one bor[
der dispute with a neighbor, mainly over territorial claims, and
largely over a laQH oL Qlearly deLined and /arHed boundariesZ895
After the Belgians determined that the major central African
Atlantic deltas led to navigable interiors, spurring French and
German incursions into the region, the British eventually set-
tled on an additional counterbalance to protect established
Greater East African interests and to expand control. Subse-
*uently, "ritain’s ;oyal VeographiQal :oQiety underwrote ;iQh[
ard "urton’s and Tohn Hanning :peHe’s F?B@N1859 search for
the source of the Nile River.96 Building on the knowledge of that
90. See Bamuturaki Musinguzi, Africa’s Long Running Border Disputes to
be Settled Under Ambitious AU Programme, DAILY NATION (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/DN2/AU-programme-to-settle-border-
disputes/-/957860/2529196/-/gu7190z/-/index.html.
91. See generally Daniel G. Acheson-Brown, The Tanzanian Invasion of
Uganda: A Just War? 12 INT’L THIRDWORLD. STUD. J & REV. 1N11 (2001) (dis-
cussing Uganda’s invasion of Tanzania in October 1978 and Tanzania’s retali-
atory effort to end Ugandan dictator Idi Amin Dada’s rule); Fulgence S. Msaf-
iri, Escalation and Resolution of Border Disputes and Interstate Conflicts in
Africa: The Malawi-Tanzania Case 28 June 2011) (unpublished M.A. thesis)
(http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5701).
92. For a discussion on ethnic problems caused by the partitioning, see
MCEWEN, supra note 62, at 147N49.
93. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Ethnic Violence in Rift Valley Is Tearing
Kenya Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2008), at A3.
94. ODUNTAN, supra note 46, at 157.
95. Id. (quoting Wafula Okomu).
96. See generally RICHARDBURTON, THENILEBASIN [BY] RICHARD F. BURTON
AND CAPTAIN SPEKE’S DISCOVERY OF THE SOURCE OF THE NILE BY JAMES
MACQUEEN. NEW INTRODUCTION BY ROBERT O. COLLINS (1967) [1864]. Collins
claims Burton misrepresented his intentions, informing the Royal Geograph-
ical Society of the plan to find the mythical inland talked about by ArabsKthe
Sea of Ujiji. See id. at ixNx. See generally JOHNHANNING SPEKE, WHAT LED TO
THE DISCOVERY OF THE SOURCE OF THE NILE (1864); GEORGE C. SWAYNE, LAKE
678 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:2
geography, Britain undertook construction (using imported In-
dian labor) of the misnamed Ugandan Railway, an engineering
masterpiece connecting Mombasa on the Indian Ocean to the
northeast corner of Lake Victoria, with Kisumu as the termi-
nus.97 Winston Churchill noted that its construction accommo-
dated the sole political concern of securing British predominance
over the Upper Nile, which included an emerging scramble for
Uganda following the expulsion of the Kabaka of Buganda,
Mwanga II, in 1897.98 In 1907, Churchill rode the six-hundred-
/ile railway and Qalled it 9a slender thread oL sQientiLiQ Qivili`a[
tion Z Z Z drawn aQross the pri/eval Qhaos oL the world,899 but he
saw nothing of Uganda. On completion of the railway in April
F>XE, :ir !le/ent Hill, the Woreign =LLiQe’s :uperintendent oL
African Protectorates, declared the railroad a part of Kenya; he
placed East Africa up to the eastern shore of Lake Victoria under
one QhieLdo/, leaving all territory west to another QhieLZ Hill’s
decision to relocate the Eastern Province of the Uganda Protec-
torate to the East African Protectorate removed the huge portion
of the Rift Valley stretching to the Kedong River near Naivasha
from the traditional control of Ugandan kingdoms, gifting it to
what would become Kenya.100 Mindful, but unmoved by the ob-
JeQtion that 9the transLer oL 7ganda’s Eastern ProvinQe would
VICTORIA: ANARRATIVE OFEXPLORATIONS INSEARCHOF THESOURCE OF THENILE
COMPILED FROM THE MEMOIRS OF CAPTAINS SPEKE AND GRANT (1868); ALAN
MOREHEAD, THE WHITE NILE (1960); ALAN MOREHEAD, THE BLUE NILE (1962);
and TIM JEAL, EXPLORERS OF THENILE, THE TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY OF AGREAT
VICTORIAN ADVENTURE (2011).
97. SeeHenry Gunston, The Planning and Construction of the Uganda Rail-
way, 74 TRANS. NEWCOMEN SOC. 45, 45 (2002). See generally CHARLESMILLER,
THE LUNATIC EXPRESS: AN ENTERTAINMENT IN IMPERIALISM (1971); and M.F.
HILL, PERMANENTWAY: THE STORY OF THEKENYA ANDUGANDARAILWAY (1949).
98. See D. ANTHONY LOW & R. CRANFORD PRATT, BUGANDA AND BRITISH
OVERRULE: 1900N1955, TWOSTUDIES 8 (1960) (noting the importance of Uganda
(Buganda) as the key to the interior following Mwanga’s expulsion).
99. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, MY AFRICAN JOURNEY 4 (solely political) and 5N
6 (slender thread of scientific civilization) (1908). For a discussion of the finan-
cial failure of the British East Africa Company and the need to convince British
Parliament to finance the Uganda railway to secure imperial rather than com-
mercial interests, see RONALD ROBINSON, JOHNGALLAGHER WITH ALICEDENNY,
AFRICA AND THE VICTORIANS: THE OFFICIAL MIND OF IMPERIALISM 307N311
(1961).
100. See SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTED
WORLD: THEROLE OFUTI POSSIDETIS 113 (2002) (discussing the transfer of the
large portion of Uganda to the East Africa Protectorate, and Hill’s motivations
of administrative economy).
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involve the severance of the tribes . . . from their natural focus
in 7ganda,8101 Hill intended to keep the entire railway line un-
der one local colonial administration.102 Shrinking the kingdom
oL "uganda and dividing other peoples’ historiQal territories
Qeded eventual proble/s oL East #LriQa’s White Highlands to
Kenya,103 causing the latter much future conflict; it also fixed
7ganda’s relation to Senya along a divide in LaHe 3iQtoria that
101. Kenneth Ingham, Uganda’s Old Eastern Province: The Transfer to East
Africa Protectorate in 1902, 21 UGANDA J. 41, 44 (1957). Steamer service con-
nected Entebbe (Port Alice) to Kisumu’s Port Florence. Id. at 47. The British
had to undertake 9punitive expeditions against refractory tribes8 displaced
along the railway line and throughout the territory who were transferred from
Uganda’s Eastern Province to the East African Protectorate, including expedi-
tions against the Nandi in 1900, 1903, and between 1905 and 1906, and the
Ogaden Somalis in 1901 (after the assassination of a subcommissioner, the
Sotik, in 1906, the occupation of Marakwet in 1911, and Northern Jubaland in
1912 and 1914, among the Giriama in 1914, two campaigns in Turkana in 1915
and 1917, and punitive measures again in Jubaland in 1916 and 1917). See
REPORT ON THE COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA FOR THE YEAR 1927, NO.
1425, 14N15 (1929), http://libsysdigi.library.illinois.edu/ilharvest/Afri-
cana/Books2011-05/5530244/5530244_1927/5530244_1927_opt.pdf.
102. See D.A. LOW, FABRICATION OF EMPIRE: THE BRITISH AND THE UGANDA
KINGDOMS, 1890N1902, 126 (2009); W.E.F. WARD & L.W. WHITE, EAST AFRICA:
A CENTURY OFCHANGE 1870N1970, 71N72 (1971).
103. In addition to consolidating the administration of the Uganda Railway
in the East Africa Protectorate, the British deemed the territory suitable for a
white man’s country. The term 9White Highlands8 is derived from that policy
of setting aside these agricultural lands in Kenya for settlers of European
origin. See generally W.T.W. Morgan, The ‘White Highlands’ of Kenya, 129
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 140N55 (1963). The promotion of European settlement was
deemed necessary to prevent the railway from turning into a serious financial
liability. See LOW& PRATT, supra note 97, at 180. To accommodate the nearly
one hundred European settlers in the region in April 1903, pastoralist territo-
ries of the Masai, on both sides of the Uganda Railway in the Rift Valley, were
taken over, and the Masai were removed to reserves sixty miles to the north
and toward German East Africa in the south. The Nandi, Lumbwa, and Kavi-
rondo nations were repositioned as part of the East Africa Protectorate. See
REPORT ON THE COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA FOR THE YEAR 1927, NO.
1425, supra note 101, at 13. The 1929 Hilton Young Commission, which formed
to investigate closer ties among British territories, concluded that this decision
cut the Masai nation into two 9with no more concern . . . than the scythe has
for a blade of grass.8MCEWEN, supra note 62, at 147 (quoting the Hilton Young
Commission).
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eventually would involve Migingo, stirring ethnic tensions in-
volving 7ganda’s "antu-speaHing peoples and Migingo’s prinQi[
pal future inhabitants, the Luo.104
II. CARTOGRAPHIC SHORTCUTS AND A FUTURE PROBLEM FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Scramble for Africa resulted in cartographic shortcuts.
Many border demarcations were approximated or artificially de-
termined.105 They were not made in reference to linguistics or
ethnicity but in reference to particular geographical features,
which presented problems of their own. Malcolm Shaw noted:
9d#c nu/ber oL #LriQan boundaries were not de/arQated Lor rea[
sons of expense or lack of trained personnel, while in the case of
boundaries between two colonies (or two parts of one colony) be-
longing to the same State, demarcation was often deemed un-
neQessaryZ8106 International Court of Justice (ICJ) judge, Bola
#Jibola, tooH notiQe oL the i/perial/indset involving #LriQa’s ar[
bitrary partition, *uoting Lord :alisbury’s F?>X state/ent in the
Territorial Dispute Qase _LibyaY!had, F>>C^: 9We have been giv[
ing away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hin-
dered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly
where the /ountains and rivers and laHes wereZ8107 Lord Cur-
zon, who partitioned Bengal for administrative reasons in 1904,
and attempted to do the same with Poland,108 famously encap-
sulated the 9unsurprising8 dangers oL i/perial line drawing,
104. See Tabu Butagira,Museveni ‘feared Raila’s Luo plans’, DAILYMONITOR
(Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1076120/-
/cjwy2mz/-/%2523 (summarizing a U.S. diplomatic cable made public by the
Wikileaks website discussing Uganda’s concerns about diasporadic Luo com-
munities in western Kenya and in Uganda’s Acholi subregion, where many
Ugandan opposition Members of Parliament are of Luo origin).
105. See CHARLES DE VISSCHER, PROBLÈMES DE CONFINS EN DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 17 (1969) (noting 9L’Afrique est celui de tous les conti-
nents qui, du fait de ses vastes regions désertiques ou inexplorées, de la faible
densité des populations, de l’absence ou de l’ignorance de leur passé historique,
s’est prêté le mieux aux delimitations dites artificielles.8).
106. Shaw, supra note 86, at 260N61.
107. Territorial Dispute Case, (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 9 (Feb. 3) (sep-
arate opinion by J. Ajibola). See also Robert McCorquodale & Raul Pan-
galangan, Pushing Back the Limitations of Territorial Boundaries, 12 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 867, 867N68 (2001).
108. See II DAVID DILKES, CURZON IN INDIA 204 (1969); PRAMILA SHARMA,
CURZON-NAMA: AUTOCRAT CURZON, UNCONQUERABLE INDIA 133N41 (1999); See
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stating: 9Wrontiers are indeed the ra`or’s edge on whiQh hang
suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to
nationsZ8109 And yet, imprecision involving European treaty
making in Africa often reduced it to a level of routineKthe Brit-
ish East Africa Company equipped its agents with 9parQels oL
blank pro forma, which only required the inscription of the name
oL the relevant QhieL, the plaQe, the date, the QhieL’s /arH, andK
a point on which the British Foreign Office insistedKthe signa-
ture oL two witnessesZ8110 Former ad hoc judge of the ICJ,
Georges Abi-:aab, obJeQted to the !ha/ber’s 9eaQessively de[
tailed analysis oL WrenQh Qolonial law8 in the Frontier Dispute
case between the two former French colonies, Burkina Faso and
Mali, Linding it not 9Litting Z Z Z Lor an international court and . .
Z largely superLluousZ8111 He negated the legal crossover or con-
tinuum juris effect in his separate opinion,112 animating Gbenga
=duntan’s observation that it 9is beQo/ing generally Qlear, espe[
cially to non-Western judges, that precautions ought to be taken
in Judg/ents when Qonsidering Qolonial lawZ8113 Aspects of the
Migingo Island dispute reflect that imperial insouciance.
A. The 1926 British Order in Council
A 1926 British Order in Council, an administrative measure of
governance stemming from Royal prerogative, rather than par-
liamentary approval,114 grouped the entire 580 mile (933 kilome-
ter^ interterritorial boundary 9sQhedule8 between the
generally Piotr Eberhardt, The Curzon Line as the Eastern Boundary of Po-
land: The Origins and the Political Background, 85 GEOGRAPHIA POLONICA 5N
21 (2012).
109. LORD CURZON OFKEDLESTON, THE ROMANES LECTURES, 1907: FRONTIERS
7 (1908).
110. LOW&PRATT, supra note 97, at 3.
111. Frontier Dispute 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 3 (Dec. 22) (separate opinion by J.
Abi-Saab).
112. Id. ¶ 4.
113. ODUNTAN, supra note 46, at 19.
114. An Order in Council is the main form of prerogative legislation stem-
ming from the British monarch’s direct involvement in treaty making and in-
ternational affairs. Its chief characteristic today vests such powers in govern-
ment ministries and administrators acting under ministerial directive, and not
parliamentary approval. See generally Thomas Poole, United Kingdom: The
Royal Prerogative, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 146, 146N55 (2010). Anthony Asiwaju
noted that the borders of modern Africa constituted so much of a 9European
superimposition8 that the legal nomenclature and instruments (such as Orders
in Council) for dealing with them have remained exactly the same. Anthony I.
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Uganda/Kenya protectorates into essentially three sectors from
north to south: from the northern tripoint with Sudan (Mount
Zulia) to Mount Elgon; from Mount Elgon to the Mouth of the
:io ;iver on LaHe 3iQtoria’s northern littoral%115 and from the
thalweg116 of the Sio River to the tripoint border with Tanzania,
loQated on the Lirst parallel south _F5south^ latitude at 9approai[
/ately8 DD5BA’ east longitudeZ117 This latter seg/ent, 9with /i[
nor variations,8 aligns Pyra/id, Ule/ba, Siringit, Mageta, and
Sumba islands along a meridian,118 situating the southern
tripoint boundary (demarcating Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania)
in Lake Victoria. The line segment derived from the 1890 latitu-
dinal bilateral agreement between the German and British trad-
ing companies.119 It connected longitudinally with a boundary
line drawn due south of the westernmost point of Pyramid Island
in 1926, part of the three islands making up the sometimes
Qalled 9Migingo Uslands,8 and eatended Lro/ Pyra/id Usland due
north 9to the /ost westerly point oL Ule/ba d;e/bac UslandZ8120
When connected to the northern segments dividing Uganda and
Asiwaju, Borders and Borderlands as Linchpins for Regional Integration in
Africa: Lessons of the European Experience, in GLOBAL BOUNDARIES: WORLD
BOUNDARIES VOLUME I, 57, 60 (Clive H. Schofield ed., 1994).
115. Order in Council Annexing to His Majesty’s Dominions and including in
Kenya Colony certain Territories in Uganda Protectorate, London, February 1,
1926, 123 (Part 1) BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATEPAPERS 123N25 (1926) [Order in
Council].
116. A thalweg is the line of deepest soundings along the course of a river; it
is the main navigable channel as opposed to the middle of a river. See Charles
Cheney Hyde, Notes on Rivers as Boundaries, 6 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 902N03
(1912) (discussing thalwegs).
117. Order in Council, supra note 115, at 123N25. See also IAN BROWNLIE,
AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPAEDIA 943N944
(1979). The alignment relied heavily on a survey of the Kanyagerang-Turkwell
area conducted by P.W. Perryman in 1922. Id. at 942. The 1926 British Order
in Council partitioned Uganda yet again, transferring to the British East Af-
rica Protectorate the remaining Rudolf Province of Uganda, a large area
bounded in the east and south by Lake Rudolf and the Turkwel River (pres-
ently the Turkana District of Kenya’s Rift Valley). See id. at 940N42. See also
International Boundary Study Kenya7Uganda Boundary, 139 GEOGRAPHER,
OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH 4 (Aug.
27, 1973), http://fall.fsulawrc.com/collection/LimitsinSeas/IBS139.pdf.
118. See VICTOR PRESCOTT & GILLIAN D. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS
AND BOUNDARIES: LAW, POLITICS ANDGEOGRAPHY 304 (2008).
119. See BROWNLIE, supra note 117, at 924N25 (reprinting the 1890 agree-
ment).
120. Id. at 944 (reprinting the Order in Council, Schedule (1)).
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Kenya, it appears this 86 mile (138 kilometer) border segment
sHirts Migingo’s western shoals by a Lew hundred /eters, plaQ[
ing Migingo wholly within Senya’s bordersZ121 Problematically,
as "rownlie’s African Boundaries encyclopedia records, the
alignment produced by the 1926 British Order in CouncilKde-
spite mentioning markers, pillars, and coordinatesKwas de-
scribed in terms which to some extent lacked precise defini-
tionZ8122 The reference to geographical features cannot produce
great preQision when 9so/e oL those Leatures laQH Qlear deLini[
tionZ8123 The use of thalwegs, island chains, and straight line
methods of demarcation had administrative and cartographic
appeal in a colonial age (and today), but factual evidence in sup-
port of effectivités, retrospectively applied to cover geospatial re-
gimes not precisely delineated at the time (which subsequently
have gained an economic value), also created problems. As the
Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration has noted, such
evidence may be voluminous in quantity yet sparse in useful con-
tent.124 Rivers and thalwegs change course,125 as has the naviga-
ble channel of the Sio River, one of the physical features used in
121. See Gettleman, supra note 32 (quoting Durham University’s Interna-
tional Border Research Unit’s geographer John Donaldson’s conclusion on re-
view of the 1926 British Order in Council). See also Boundary News: Kenya,
Uganda Border Survey and Demarcation in Lake Victoria Will Continue After
Difficult Start [Boundary News], IBRU: CENTRE FOR BORDERS RESEARCH (May
5, 2009), https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/bound-
ary_news/?itemno=7923&rehref=%2Fibru (9[I]t is likely that the joint survey
will find Migingo positioned on the Kenyan side of the boundary.8).
122. BROWNLIE, supra note 117, at 953.
123. Id. (noting as well that subsequent demarcations took place in phases in
1927, 1933, and between 1959 and 1960; that uncertainties with regard to
alignment at the time of publication (1979) did not pertain to the Migingo area;
and that since independence, both countries 9have recognized the alignment in
principle8). See alsoWafula Okumu, Resources and Border Disputes in Eastern
Africa, 4 J. E. AFR. STUD. 279, 284 (2010) (discussing limitations of colonial
boundary making).
124. Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of Proceedings (Terri-
torial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute) (Eri./Yemen) 71 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1998).
125. See STEPHEN B. JONES, BOUNDARY-MAKING: A HANDBOOK FOR
STATESMEN, TREATY EDITORS AND BOUNDARY COMMISSIONERS 117 (1971) (dis-
cussing surveying problems relating to rivers and thalwegs).
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the 1926 British Order in Council to demarcate the southern bor-
der.126 Some evidence suggests that Migingo was the generic
name of the undifferentiated island chain, which only later more
specifically differentiated the two other islands as Ugingo and
Pyramid Island.127 Ugandan surveyors claim, however, that Ug-
ingo, which lies east of Migingo, is actually Pyramid Island, as
referenced in the 1926 British Order in Council, because it is
shaped like a pyramid.128 This claim has led Ugandan and Ken-
yan surveyors to dispute which of the three islands referred to
in the colonial boundary documents is Pyramid Island.129 Both
countries disputed ownership before independence in the early
1960s,130 but 7gandan diQtator Udi #/in fada’s period oL /is[
rule (1971NF>@>^ has served as an eaplanation Lor 7ganda’s in[
ability to sustain its claim. The delicate diplomatic border dis-
pute involving Migingo sits atop abundant fishing stock but also
atop broader revanchist sentiments espoused by Amin in
1976,131 and later hinted at by President Museveni, who dis-
126. SeeWarui David Njoka, The East African Community and Dispute Set-
tlement (A Case of Migingo Island) 78N79 (May 2013) (unpublished M.A. the-
sis, University of Nairobi Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies),
http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/52603?show=full (noting that the
Sio River has changed its course a number of times, producing different sur-
veying interpretations as to fixing the thalweg’s location).
127. See Boundary News, supra note 121 (noting but discounting the possible
problem concerning the islands having multiple names).
128. See Odoobo C. Bichachi, Why Have Survey Teams Failed to Agree on
Migingo?, DAILY MONITOR (Mar. 27, 2016), http://www.monitor.co.ug/Maga-
zines/PeoplePower/Why-have-survey-teams-failed-to-agree-on-Migingo/-
/689844/3134672/-/gm560gz/-/index.html.
129. Paragraph 6 of the Joint Communiqué reads: 9In determining the loca-
tion of Migingo Island, the survey team is informed by arguments from both
sides on which of the two islands next to Migingo constitute the Pyramid Is-
land. In this regard, straight lines shall be drawn from Rmeba (Ilemba) Island
to the two islands.8 See Samwel Kumba, Why Migingo Survey Stalled, DAILY
NATION (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/636292/-/4fjlcrz/-
/index.html. Another sticking point involves Ugandan surveyors’ insistence
that that buoys be placed as permanent border markers in the lake. See
Bichachi, supra note 128.
130. See Shaka, supra note 41, at 35.
131. See Bamuturaki Musinguzi, The Day Idi AminWanted to Annex Western
Kenya, EAST AFRICAN (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.theeastafri-
can.co.ke/news/The+day+Idi+Amin+wanted+to+annex+western+Kenya/-
/2558/1234090/-/u5ilxrz/-/index.html (recalling Amin’s 1976 claim for the re-
turn of Kenyan districts ceded by British colonial rule).
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cussed the restoration of Greater Uganda by extending the ter-
ritory to near Naivasha.132 Shifting one border, even by a matter
oL /eters, to aQQo//odate Migingo’s Late, however, te/pts a
domino effect of border transformations between the two coun-
tries that neither disputant can countenance.
III. UTI POSSIDETIS, LES EFFECTIVITÉS, AND AFRICAN ELITES
The arbitrary effects of boundary drawing by retreating colo-
nial powers has been well studied in the Americas, Africa, and
Asia.133 The justifications for the doctrine emphasized conven-
ience and expediency,134 the desire to quiet title and prevent con-
troversy over postcolonial boundary contours, and the avoidance
of competing territorial claims based on terra nullius (land be-
longing to no one).135 Presumptively, states emerging from de-
colonization were to inherit the colonial borders held at the time
of independence.136Uti possidetis served to freeze territorial title
based on colonial maps, however imprecise, or actual territorial
possession, 9no/atter how arbitrary those boundaries/ay have
132. MUSEVENI: Uganda territory extends up to Nakuru, Mzee Kenyatta
Grabbed Our Land, POLITICA (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.poli-
tics.co.ke/global/museveni-uganda-territory-extends-nakuru-mzee-kenyatta-
grabbed-land/ (quoting Ugandan President Museveni’s claim that 9[t]he origi-
nal world maps of 1924 shows clearly Uganda extends to almost Naivasha8).
133. See, e.g., Paul R. Hensel, Michael E. Allison & Ahmend Khanani, The
Colonial Legacy and Border Stability: Uti Possidetis and Territorial Claims in
the Americas (International Studies Association Meeting, Montreal, 2004),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Paul_Hensel/publica-
tion/253878664_The_Colonial_Legacy_and_Border_Stability_Uti_Posside-
tis_and_Territorial_Claims_in_the_Ameri-
cas/links/00b7d5326ea9761b12000000.pdf ; Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Bet-
ter Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 590
(1996); Jan Klabbers & René Lefeber, Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination
and Uti Possidetis, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37
(Catherine Brölmann, René Lefeber & Marjoleine Zieck eds., 1993); see gener-
ally SAADIA TOUVAL, THE BOUNDARY POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT AFRICA (1972);
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June
15); Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India/Pak.), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633 (1968).
134. A.O. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (1967).
135. Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar., in-
tervening), Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 351, 387 (Sept. 11); Enver Hasani, Uti Pos-
sidetis Juris: From Rome To Kosovo, 27 FLETCHERF.WORLDAFF. 85, 86 (2003).
136. See Ratner, supra note 133, at 590.
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been drawnZ8137 Despite its lack of precision138 and coercive ele-
ments, 139 uti possidetis became, and remains, a major building
block of the international legal system.140 The ICJ validated it
as 9a general prinQiple,8141 and its application expands beyond
the postcolonial settings that gave birth to its application.142
LiHe the e/ergenQe oL sovereignty’s double sword oL i/perial
and papal power in the early modern European age,143 uti possi-
detis transmuted to accommodate the interests of African
elites,144 informing the Charter of the Organization of African
7nity _9=#78^,145 appearing in#rtiQle C_b^ oL the#LriQan7nion’s
Constitutive Act,146 taking its place in the 1964 OAU Cairo Dec-
laration,147 and shifting subsequent African border discussions
137. See Klabbers & Lefeber, supra note 133, at 37.
138. See C.H.M. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falklands Islands De-
pendencies, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 311, 325 (1948) (labeling it 9indefinite and
ambiguous8).
139. See TOUVAL, supra note 133, at 17 (noting that an element of coercion is
almost universally involved in uti possidetis’ application).
140. See Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 567 (Dec. 22).
141. Id. at 565. See also Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute
(Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 89 (sep. op. J. Ajibola).
142. See, e.g., Opinion No. 3, Dec. 17 1991, Badinter Commission (applied
beyond the colonial context following ethnic cleansing in the former Yugosla-
via). Opinion No. 3, the Arbitration commission of the Peace Conference on
Yugoslavia [Badinter Commission], Jan. 11, 1992, reprinted at 31 I.L.M.1499
n. 14, 1500 (1992).
143. See Hent Kalmo, Sovereignty: A Painful State, 63 HIST. TODAY (Jan. 1,
2013), http://www.historytoday.com/hent-kalmo-covereignty-painful-state.
144. See Mbembe, supra note 36, at 261N62 (summarizing a prevailing idea
that African elites adopted distortions of colonial boundaries, adhered to the
dogma of their intangibility, and granted them a kind of legitimacy).
145. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity art. III (3), 479
U.N.T.S. 39, May 25, 1963 (respecting 9the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence8),
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/OAU_Charter_1993.html.
146. CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION [OAU] (July 11, 2000),
http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/ngm/Documents/Conventions%20and%20Res-
olutions/constitution.pdf (calling for 9respect of borders existing on achieve-
ment of independence8).
147. Resolution on the Intangibility of Frontiers, OAU Doc. AGH/Res. 16 (I)
(1964), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 49
(Gino J. Naldi ed., 1992).
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away from questions of colonial illegitimacy toward the manage-
ment domestic needs.148 African critics of the principle neverthe-
less acknowledge its grip over boundary alignments of the conti-
nent, which are far more maintained than in Spanish America,
Europe, or Asia.149 Explanations focus on political consolidation
and state-building efforts of newly independent African states,
where centralizing state authority and codifying national iden-
tity and unity outweighed the focus on secondary issues, like
borderland integrity.150 Postcolonial African statecraft pre-
sented the inward-looking project of crafting imagined political
community, while porous and peripheral borders and commit-
ments to Pan-#LriQan ideals 9only /attered in Qonteats where
they did not conflict with national interestZ8151 Application of uti
possidetis compels Uganda and Kenya to accept the 1926 British
Order in Council and the schedules to the 1995 Ugandan Con-
148. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Devel-
opment and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), OAU ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF
STATE AND GOVERNMENT (July 2002) Decision Cm/Dec.666 (LXXVI) (providing
for the delineation and demarcation of African boundaries by 2012, where such
an exercise has not yet taken place); Declaration on the African Union Border
Programme and its Implementation Modalities as Adopted by the Conference of
African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues held in Addis Ababa (June 7,
2007), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/border-issues.pdf (noting that the par-
ties were guided by respect of borders existing on achievement of national in-
dependence); Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and the
Modalities for the Pursuit and Acceleration of its Implementation, Addis Ab-
aba (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/aubp-dec-e.pdf (recalling
the principle of respect of borders existing on achievement of national inde-
pendence).
149. See e.g., DIRDEIRYM. AHMED, BOUNDARIES AND SECESSION IN AFRICA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGING UTI POSSIDETIS (2015). Ahmed notes that
90 percent of Spanish New World boundaries underwent substantial change,
and twenty or so new states have been created in Asia and Europe in twenty-
five years following the end of the Cold War, but the political map of Africa has
remained the same, except for the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan. Id. at 1.
Cf. Mbembe, supra note 36, at 271 (9[B]oundaries from colonialism have re-
mained essentially unaltered.8).
150. See KALU N. KALU, STATE POWER, AUTARCHY, AND POLITICAL CONQUEST
IN NIGERIAN FEDERALISM 12 (2008) (discussing the analytical framework for
African state formation).
151. Wekesa, supra note 23, at 334.
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stitution and the 1963 Kenyan Constitution as the primary doc-
uments dealing with the dispute.152 Other legislative, geo-
graphic, and constitutional sources confirmed the schedule de-
marcation of the 1926 British Order in Council.153 The rule is not
in dispute. Rather, the countries dispute the facts pertaining to
the exact location of the westernmost point of any given island
as described by the 1926 British Order in Council.154
A. Historical Confusion, Uti Possidetis, and the Value of Effec-
tivités
When historical confusion obscures the establishment of defin-
itive legal title, international law processes the application of uti
possidetis through international courts and tribunals, which
seek out two elements in establishing sovereign authority: the
intention to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display
of such authority.155 Together, they establish a discernable ex-
pression of sovereign authorityKà titre de souverain.156 When à
152. See National Assembly Official Report, KENYANAT’LASSEMBLYOFFICIAL
REC. (HANSARD) 1N2 (Dec. 14, 2010) (referencing the Kenya-Uganda Joint Bor-
der Commission’s joint communiqué accepting the primary documents).
153. See The Kenya Independence Order in Council, No. 1968 (1963) KENYA
GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 105; International Boundary Study Kenya-Uganda
Boundary, supra note 117; CONSTITUTION art. 5, 174, 187 (1995) (Uganda); re-
affirming CONSTITUTION, Schedule 1, The Boundary of Uganda, art. 2(2), 83,
90N91 (1967) (Uganda) (9[T]hence following a straight line southerly to the
most westerly point of Ilemba [Remba] Island; thence following a straight line
southerly to the westernmost point of Pyramid island; thence following a
straight line due south to a point on latitude 01000’S.8); and the Kenya Colony
and Protectorate (Boundaries) Order in Council 1926; Brownlie cites as addi-
tional confirmations the IX Laws of Uganda, Rev. 31 (1964); CONSTITUTION,
Schedule 1 (1967) (Uganda), XI Laws of Kenya, Rev. group 2, at 7 (1962); and
Kenyan Legal Notices Nos. 386 (1961) and 193 and 207 (1963), in addition to
Kenya Legal Notice No. 718, supra. See BROWNLIE, supra note 117, at 945.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. V. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 53, 45N46 (Apr. 5).
156. Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings be-
tween Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute),
22 R.I.A.A. 268, ¶ 241 (1998) (requiring evidence of a consolidation of title for
establishment of claims of à titre de souverain); Malcolm Shaw, The Interna-
tional Court of Justice and the Law of Territory, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 151, 168 (Chris-
tian J. Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013).
2017] The Migingo Island Dispute 689
titre de souverain is established, international law will not ac-
commodate additional arguments to upset the status quo.157 Es-
tablishment of an animus occupandiKan actual intent and abil-
ity to exercise power and authorityKexercised through imme-
morial usage or uncontested demonstrable claimKhas been
deemed a relevant indicator of good title.158 But, where the sta-
tus quo remains in dispute, decisionmakers will seek out pre-
colonial or postcolonial factual circumstancesKeffectivitésKas
supplementary means of ascertaining sovereignty.159
Charles De Visscher devoted a monograph to the subject of ef-
fectivité, noting its dynamic aspects (en action), as contrasted to
its structural forms (d’effectivitGs menGes à terme),160 and its
functions of promoting practicality, stability, security, continu-
ity, and finality to disputes.161 De Visscher cautioned against ex-
pansive applications or errors likely to result from the full pur-
suit of its application.162 Similarly, Jean Touscoz argued against
expansive extrapolations of its meaning, emphasizing its iden-
tity as a concrete supplement to conditions that exist.163 Re-
course to the principle of effectivité cannot create sovereignty; it
can only confirm or validate sovereignty.164 But, proof of effec-
tivité often creates cottage industries revolving around proof of
competing historical narratives. Disputes over effectivités follow-
ing :pain’s F?FX retreat Lro/ the Rew World involved deQipher[
ing the imprecisions of colonial maps charted in the sixteenth
157. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. at 586N87.
158. Eritrea v. Yemen, 22 R.I.A.A. 268, ¶239 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1988).
159. Honduras Borders (Guat./Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1307, 1325 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1933); CHARLES DE VISSCHER, LES EFFECTIVITÉS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 111N14 (1967) (discussing 9Le role secondaire de l’effectivité à l’encontre
d’un titre conventionnel dans les contestations de frontiers8).
160. See DEVISSCHER, supra note 159, at 13N24.
161. See id. at 153N58.
162. See id. at 151N52 (9Il convient toutefois de se mettre en garde dès l’abord
contre une erreur assez fréquente qui conduit à confondre la recherché de l’ef-
fectivité, qui n’est autre ici que celle de la pleine realization du droit, avec l’in-
terpretation extensive. L’effectivité du droit judiciairement applicable tend non
pas à donner à la règle son maximum d’effet intellectuellement conceivable,
mais seulement à lui assurer, compte tenu des textes, des circonstances de fait
et de milieu, toute la place que lui assigne la source de droit don’t elle procède.8).
163. JEAN TOUSCOZ, LE PRINCIPE D’EFFECTIVITÉ DANS L’ORDRE INTERNATIONAL
2 (1964) (9L’effectivité est la nature de ce qui existe en fait, de ce qui existe
concrètement, réellement; elle s’oppose à ce qui est fictive, imaginaire ou pure-
ment verbal.8).
164. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 587.
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century.165 Arguments involving border disputes in Europe, for
instance, in the ongoing dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, gener-
ate entitlement claims that stretch back more than a millen-
nium.166 !hina’s assertion oL historiQ rights over the :outh
!hina :ea ste/ Lro/ 9a long Qourse oL history,8 whiQh the tribu[
nal in the South China Sea Arbitration could not understand due
to !hina’s a/biguity on the issue% although !hina was absent
from the proceedings, the tribunal nevertheless noted a more re-
cent date when !hina’s 9nine-dash line8 Lirst appeared on an oL[
ficial Chinese map: 1948.167 Without a doubt, effectivités are
meaningful when they are not contrived, as they sometimes may
be used to instantiate a historical narrative over who was the
first finder; but, they lack probative meaning with regard to
Migingo. A requisite animus occupandi was never at issue until
Qhanges to the laHe’s hydrologiQal water table/ade it a suitable
port for harvesting Nile perch hardly more than one decade ago.
Both countries embrace an animus occupandi, but circum-
stanQes Lorestall either Qountry’s territoriali`ing obJeQtiveZ
CONCLUSION
Ugandan and Kenyan leaders find themselves in a double bind
over Migingo: rhetorical respect for uti possidetis informs their
political identity and motivates them to adhere to a postcolonial
principle of boundary demarcation to which they cannot com-
pletely abide, while they search for supporting effectivités that
do not historically exist in order to claim better title to an islet
that had no significance until it was accessed to hunt a valuable
nonnative resource that is devastating the biology of the lake.
The countries seek to establish better title from constitutive doc-
uments to a border demarcation imprecisely devised from a co-
lonial decision to administer a railway under a single jurisdic-
tion more than one century ago, an act which itself dislodged
populations and hinged partly on a previous decision by German
and British trading companies to cleave Lake Victoria into sov-
165. LALONDE, supra note 100, at 31 (noting the vague and imprecise border
demarcations of Iberian monarchs in the New World).
166. See TIM POTIER, CONFLICT INNAGORNO-KARABAKH, ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH
OSSETIA: A LEGALAPPRAISAL 1 (2001) (noting historical conquests and disputed
territorial claims dating to the early eighth century).
167. In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), P.C.A.
No. 2012-19, ¶¶ 180N87 (July 12, 2016).
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ereign halves. When the search for les effectivités hinges on his-
torical obscurities or uncertainties and is marked by an epoch of
imperial line drawing that preferred administrative economy
over human geography, the purported formalism of interna-
tional law, as measured by rational outcomes supporting cer-
tainty and finality, appears less rational and functional. Be-
neath the legal formalism of uti possidetis, complex modalities
of engagement and practice are at work. These modalities seek
to enhance territorializing interests but, failing that, present
prospects for cooperation and condominium (or stasis). Despite
the territorializing temptation that hampers condominium solu-
tions, markers suggest that the principals are content to con-
tinue with the indeterminate course of dealing that supports
nonresolution of the border dispute, perhaps until the workings
of a shared solution present themselves in the form of answers
to the much more serious economic, social, and political issues
suggested by sweeping degradations to LaHe 3iQtoria’s environ[
mental basin. Evidence of an intersubjective will to forestall a
solution appears from a tally of circumstantial complaints. The
dispute is more than ten years old, with little momentum trend-
ing toward a solution. At least three technical survey teams have
formed since 2009, and each has failed to carry out its mission.
The disputants agree on the constitutive documents demarcat-
ing the border question, a point often in dispute and fatal to
other negotiated border settlements. Rhetorical statements from
leaders express a willingness to negotiate a diplomatic solution.
Officials from both countries have proposed removing the dis-
pute to an international tribunal for settlement,168 but no formal
efforts have been made, and the suggestion engenders com-
plaints about bypassing the principle of subsidiarity, which pref-
erences African regional dispute mechanisms over broader
fora.169 An important corollary to constructivist approaches, as
informed by historical context, is that constructivism need not
result in a new form of idealism, as many enthusiasts hope.170
The intersubjective structures of international relations create
168. John Donaldson, Re-thinking International Boundary Practices: Moving
Away from the ‘Edge’, in GEOGRAPHIES OFPEACE 89, 98 (Fiona McConnell, Nick
Megoran & Philippa Williams eds., 2014).
169. Wafula Okumu, Migingo Dispute Needs an African Solution, ISS (May
28, 2009), https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/migingo-dispute-needs-an-afri-
can-solution.
170. See Reus-Smit, supra note 55, at 21.
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norms that produce their own dynamics, but there is no implied
progressivity or beneficial outcome. The Migingo Island dispute
serves as a case in point.
The Migingo Island dispute also presents challenges to East
African regionalization efforts. An array of intersubjective and
cooperative East African institutions support prospects for coop-
eration. The East African Community Treaty emphasizes sus-
tainable utilization and protection of natural resources,171 with
specific reference to the management of Lake Victoria.172 The
Lake Victoria Basin Commission and Lake Victoria Fisheries
Organization maintain responsibility over maritime security
and fisheries on the lake.173 The East African Community Strat-
egy for Regional Peace and Security promotes policy direction on
peace and security.174 Both Kenya and Uganda are members of
regional multilateral organizations, including the CommonMar-
ket for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Intergovernmental Au-
thority on Development, and the International Conference on
the Great Lakes Region.175 In 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative, a
regional intergovernmental partnership involving ten countries,
launched to promote cooperation and dialogue and achieve sus-
tainable socioeconomic development among riparian stakehold-
ers.176 Institutional supports for a negotiated solution exist,
providing agencies for the realization of intersubjective goals.
Wekesa has noted achievements of African regional integra-
tion,177 including the structures and shared discursive subjectiv-
171. See Treaty Establishing the East African Community Nov. 30, 1999, art.
5(3)(a), art. 5(3)(c), http://www.eac.int/sites/de-
fault/files/docs/treaty_eac_amended-2006_1999.pdf.
172. Id. art. 114(2)(b)(vi) (agreeing to 9the establishment of a body for the
management of Lake Victoria8).
173. See id. art. 9 (referencing the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization); See
generally LAKE VICTORIA BASIN COMMISSION, http://www.lvbcom.org/ (last vis-
ited July 21, 2017). See also 4TH EAC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (2011/12N
2015/16): DEEPENING AND ACCELERATING INTEGRATION, E. AFR. COMMUNITY
DEV. STRATEGY §§ 3.63, 3.64, http://www.eac.int/sites/default/files/docs/strat-
egy_eac_development-v4_2011-2016.pdf.
174. For background information, see generally INTERNATIONALCONFERENCE
ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION, http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/background
(last visited July 21, 2017).
175. See Wekesa, supra note 23, at 332.
176. See generally NILE BASIN INITIATIVE/INITIATIVE DU BASSIN DU NIL,
http://www.nilebasin.org/ (last visited July 21, 2017).
177. Wekesa, supra note 23, at 337.
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ities that may yield a negotiated condominium solution. But, en-
thusiasm wanes as this dispute lingers,178 giving rise to concerns
that Migingo’s fate is more conditioned by overarching territori-
alizing solutions rather than the condominium arrangements
that ultimately provide the broader safeguards needed to stave
off a coming crisis for this Great Lake and its catchment.
178. See id. (noting the Migingo crisis does not bode well for the future of the
East African Community).
